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Abstract.  Integration  of  Polish  agriculture  is  recognized  as  a  success.  Nevertheless  some  remarkable  difficulties  have 
emerged.  Some of them are related to low production quotas in dairy, sugar and starch sectors.                                                                                                                         
Authors of this Poster argue that the level of starch quota inscribed for Poland is incompatible with the principle of fair 
competition on the inner EU market. The quota ceiling of mere 145 thousand tons is a heavy constraint to the processing 
plants – their total processing capacities are estimated for some 220-260 thousand tons. Therefore, they are utilized in c. 56-
66 %, leading to the increase of unit costs of starch production of about 9,2 % and decrease of the competitiveness. 
Another point is the ratio of the quota to the volume of harvests: 0,1121 for Denmark, 0,057 for Germany and (only) 0,0131 
for Poland. Furthermore, the domestic consumption of starch products in Poland is two-fold bigger than the quota with 
resultant increase of importation. Paradoxically, such practices are pronounced in spite of unutilized natural resources of 
Polish agriculture – high proportion of light soils. The temporary solution is to increase the quota – the long-run one is to 
rethink the concept of quota system – under the new CAP reform. 




  The 20-th century had been very turbulent one for Poland with three major political transformations and 
two concurrent transformations of the system of national economy. The first, political one, was introduced in 
Autumn 1918, when Poland recovered independence after 123 years of partitions. Two further transformations 
covered both, the political and economic systems. As a result of the 2-nd world war, since 1944, the system of 
“real socialism” had been overruled upon Poland with “socialized” national economy and the democracy of the 
“dictatorship of the proletariat”, having nothing in common with the real democracy. 
In 1989, Poland rejected the oppression of the Soviet-styled socialist system as the first country of the region – 
the “bulk” of the national economy had been privatized and the system of democracy re-introduced.  
Peaceful development of Poland cut the outbreak of the war at 1-st September 1939, just 70 years ago. 
And the country could come back on the track of normal development only 50 years later, when – in September 
1989 the first non-Communist Prime Minister in Central and Eastern Europe countries announced departure 
from rules of the Centrally Planned Economy and a turn to a market oriented one. 
  Changes introduced 20 years ago made possible Poland’s membership in the NATO and the European 
Union. 
 
2. System transformation and European integration 
 
2.1. System transformation vs. pre-accession period 
 
In  the  period  preceding  Poland’s  accession  to  the  European  Union  there  were  widely  spread  fears 
among the  farmers
1 – they  were in  no  way irrational  since in those  years the European Union  was indeed 
a  bad  neighbor  for  farmers.  In  the  early  1990s  took  place  the  liberalization  of  Polish  foreign  trade  which 
contrasted with numerous support mechanisms for the Community agriculture and its protection against import 
from the third countries. It led to long-term negative balance trade in agricultural goods with the Union countries 
which was against the so-called asymmetry principle contained in the Association Treaty, signed in Brussels   
16-th December 1991. What is more, the export subsidies, which were not available for Polish manufacturers, 
eliminated our products from other markets, even such as the  Kaliningrad Oblast. It should be added that other 
exporters including the USA also experienced such difficulties. These matters of argument were the topic of  the 
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations finished in 1994. Worth to note is the fact that in the so-called Cairns Group of states opposing the European Union there was also Hungary, the country which stood as candidate for the 
Union since 1994.    
The commenced in 1989 systemic transformation obtained support from the Communities in the form of 
PHARE program
2. In the first years of the program implementation, the means designed for rural areas and 
agriculture  were  quite  modest.  In  the  period  preceding  the  accession  a  special  pre-accession  program  for 
agriculture,  referred  as  SAPARD,  was  introduced  which,  among  other  things,  was  supposed  to  prepare 
beneficiaries to make efficient  use of structural funds in the period preceding the accession.  
The  accession  negotiations  were  hard  and  lasted  over  four  and  a  half  years  (terminated  on  13
th 
December 2002) and the area of ‘agriculture’ belonged to the hardest ones. What evoked the most controversies 
was the issue of direct subsidies as well as the access to the purchase of land by foreigners on the other hand. 
Still in July 1997 the European Commission prepared a multivolume report ‘Agenda – 2000’
3, in which it was 
agreed  that  direct  subsidies  should  not  be  paid  to  the  new  member  states  at  all.  Such 
a standpoint was maintained for nearly five years until was reached a compromise on partial and gradually 
increased level of these measures of support: from 25% in the first year of membership to 100% in the year 
2013.  
The  government  of  J.  Buzek  in  turn  insisted  for  the  18-year-long  transition  period  regarding  the 
opportunity to purchase land by foreigners as a trump card. Unfortunately, his followers were not able to make 
use of it. During his stay in Brussels W. Cimoszewicz, then a Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a considerable 
concession from this initial position and obtained nothing in exchange. An indirect result of this were among 
others low milk and potato starch quotas which were imposed on Polish negotiators who had no sufficient assets 
to reach more favorable solutions. 
 
2.2. Experiences of the first years of the EU membership 
 
One of the consequences of Poland's entering the European Union was the introduction of the principles 
of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  With  one  emerging  paradox,  that  is  following  more  than  ten  years  of 
transformation Polish economy has undergone a thorough reconstruction. It also refers to agriculture, which at 
the  moment of accession  was  much closer to the  model of the  market economy than the ‘manually’ in an 
administrative way steered Union agriculture. An example of that can be the implementation of the system of 
milk quoting which will be probably withdrawn in the next budget period.   
In the initial years of membership in the Union some positive phenomena were disclosed. An increase 
of prices for a range of agricultural goods took place which unfortunately, as could have been expected, has 
turned out to be temporary. The negative balance of agricultural trade with the Community states, which lasted 
for a number of years turned out to be positive already in the year 2003 preceding our membership. From the 
very  first  months of  membership in the  Union till the end of the  year 2004 Polish agricultural export  was 
increasing at a very fast pace. In comparison with similar period of the previous year export to the ‘old’ member 
states increased by about 62.7% and by 52.6% to the ‘new’ member states. Poland soon gained the position of 
the biggest food exporter in the region of Central and Eastern European Countries whereas Hungary came as the 
second
 4. 
Covering  the  agriculture  with  direct  subsidies  and  with  a  number  of  support  programs  from  the 
Community budget have brought in a noticeable growth of income. The parity of agricultural income increased 
from 65% in 2003 to 83% in 2006
5. It was accompanied by the improvement of moods and growth of support for 
Poland’s membership in the European Union in comparison with the pre-accession period.    
In the Polish rural areas, it is possible to observe several variable trends of change: 
i)   the share of farms in the group of rural households is decreasing. It is estimated that out of 
the overall number of 4.4 million of them the households connected with farming make up 
around 49% that is less than a half ; 
ii)  a new phenomenon is the reversal of the negative migration balance, which stands for the 
fact that at present more people settle in the countryside than leave it; 
iii)  even in the farming families the farm has ceased to be the largest source of income. Life 
requires that a multifunctional development should not only be a theoretical expression but a 
driving-force to search for additional income beyond agriculture; 
iv)  the  number  of  farms  is  decreasing  (within  the  period  of  2002-2007  there  was  a  fall  of 
11.8%), whereas their average surface is increasing; 
v)  the level of education in rural areas is improving but it is still considerably inferior to the 
city (in 2007 the percentage of people with higher education was over threefold higher in 
the city than in the countryside). 
The change of political and economic system as well as the accompanying these changes European 
integration  give  the  Polish  agriculture  and  rural  areas  new  opportunities  of  growth  in  comparison  with  the 
previous period. Unfortunately, they are neither given once and for all nor smoothly, which is painfully proved by e.g. the present level of milk purchase prices. Although the Common Agricultural Policy has turned out to be 
positive in the first period of membership due to the inflow of means connected with that, it is still an imperfect 
mechanism which requires new solutions. Initial benefits started to run out, while more and more difficulties 
have emerged. The source of some of them are low production quotas that were fixed to Poland within the 
accession negotiations – it refers to dairy products, sugar and starch.  
The aim of this study is to analyze  the problem of productive capacities of the potato processing plants 
in Poland from the point of view of maintaining the conditions of fair competitiveness which constitutes one of 
the fundamental principles of functioning of inner EU market
6. 
 
3. The starch quota as a constraint to the potato economy 
 
3.1. Influence of low starch quota on the starch production costs in Poland 
 
Before  the  end  of  Poland’s  accession  negotiations  to  the  European  Union,  which  took  place  in 
December 2002 in Copenhagen, the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development took the stand to 
apply for the starch quota of 260 thousand tons whereas minimal quota to be accepted by our country was 185 
thousand tons. It should be also noted that the domestic starch production quota in Poland set for the year 2004- 
2005 was 242 thousand tons
7. The fact that we were finally granted the quota of 145 thousand tons, which made 
up only 56% of the applied one, came as an unpleasant shock. With the support of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development  as well as the representatives of the starch sector, Polish deputies to the European 
Parliament upon the initiative of J. Wojciechowski applied to increase the domestic ceiling for the next year 
(2005/2006) to 180 thousand tons. In  spite of almost unanimous resolution  in  favor  of the  motion by the 
European Parliament, even such tiny changes were not allowed. 
The processing potential of the Polish starch potato processing plants is assessed at 220-260 thousand tones. 
Imposing on the country a limit at the level of 145 thousand tones means that the existing productions capacities 
and  the  value  of  invested  capital  are  utilized  only  within  56-66%.  Assuming  the  net  profitability  of  starch 
industry plants in 2008 at the level of 2%
8 as well as 30% share of fixed costs in the total starch production costs, 
increasing the scale of starch production in the plants from 130 thousand tones (increase of 38.5%) causes a fall 
of starch production costs by 8.5% per unit. Changes of starch production cost structure are presented on the 
example of an X potato industry plant (anonymous due to the protection of trade data) in the table  1. Increasing 
the scale of starch production in the production season from 8 to 16 thousand tones caused a decrease of starch 
potato costs by nearly 10%. 
 
Table  1. Structure of costs of potato starch production (%) in the potato processing  plant „X” 
according to the yearly processing capacities (2003/04 vs. 2005/06) 
Cost item  Yearly production capacities (tons) 
16 000   8 000  
1. Raw material (potatoes)  48,3  37,1 
2. Processing  25,5  17,6 
3. Total costs of production (1 + 2)  73,8  54,7 
4. Starch marketing (selling)  5,2  8,3 
5. Administration and office  2,3  1,9 
6. General  18,8  35,2 
7. Total costs of starch manufacturing  100,0  100,0 
8. Total costs per 1 ton of starch (PLN)  1 590,6  1 757,4 
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the processing plants. 
 
High costs of potato starch production in Poland caused by low level of utilizing the production capacities of 
processing  plants  made  it  in  turn  impossible  to  increase  the  prices  for  purchase  of  potato  as 
a resource to produce starch up to the level ensuring profitability.  As the data in table 2 show, potato starch 
cultivation in Poland is characterized by negative profitability. In this situation, farmers especially the ones 
growing starch potatoes on a smaller scale, resign contracts with processing plants. And as a consequence, it is 
made difficult to utilize even such a low limit of starch production which has been assigned to our country.  
As a result, the production of Polish starch industry is burdened with exceedingly high fixed costs in 
comparison with their competitors from other EU-member states, which hampers their competitiveness. In this 
case the principle of maintaining the conditions of fair competitiveness on the uniform European market should 
stand for setting  equal relations between given member states and the starch production quota fixed to them.  
Table 2. Calculation of costs and profitability of starch potato cultivation (PLN/ha), 
assumed yield of 30 tons/ha 
    Item of input  Year 2007/08  Year 2008/09 
1. Potato seeds, purchased   830  625 
2. Potato seeds, own cultivation  410  431 
3. Pesticides  720  820 
4. Fertilizers  785  1540 
5. Machinery exploitation  1090  1520 
6. Draught power  1320  2110 
7. Credit costs of purchased inputs (yearly interest rate – 3%)  100  115 
8. Labor  600  600 
9. Total direct costs  5855  6241 
10. Indirect costs (lump,10% of the total direct costs)  585  624 
11. Total costs (9 + 10)  6440  6865 
12.Total costs per 1 tons of marketed potatoes  215  229 
13. Total value of production  6300  6750 
16. Assumed prices of marketed potatoes (PLN per 1 ton)  210  225 
21. Calculated profit (PLN per 1ha)  -140  -115 
Source: Own calculations based on the field survey of the IHAR Bonin.  
 
3.2. The relation of the starch production quota to the volume of potato harvests and 
domestic demand for starch 
 
The essential element of the comparative analysis of potato starch market is the relation of the quota to 
the cultivation area and to the volume of harvests. Decisively, Poland has the lowest relative starch production 
quota out of the biggest potato producers among the European Union members. For instance, starch production 
quota per 1000 tons of potatoes accounts for 112 tons for Denmark, 57 tons for Germany, and only 13.1 tons for 
Poland (table 3). Even more unfavorable for Poland is the relation of starch quota to the potato cultivation area. 
 
Table 3. Major EU–15 potato starch producers/a 
Country  Starch potato 













Starch potato quota 
as calculated per: 
1 ha of 
cultivated 
potatoes 
1000 tons of 
harvested 
potatoes 
Germany  656 300  273  11,5  2,4  57,0 
The Netherlands  507 400  161  6,9  3,1  73,5 
France  265 400  158  6,7  1,7  39,6 
Denmark  168 200  38  1,5  4,4  112,1 
Sweden  62 100  29  0,9  2,1  69,0 
Finland  53 200  28  0,7  1,9  76,0 
Austria  47 700  23  0,7  2,1  68,1 
The Czech Republic  33 700  32  0.8  1,1  42,1 
Poland  145 000  570  11,1  0,3  13 ,1 
a/ Quota for remaining 5 EU member countries (Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Estonia) fixed at the 
level of 9900 tons. 
Source: Own calculations based on the data from: Hambloch Ch., Menth H., Stelzer M., Schaack D., Wilckens 
A., Graf G. 2007. ZMP – Marktbilanz. Kartoffeln 2007. Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtstelle GmbH, Bonn, 
p.127. 
 The  volume  of  the  starch  production  ceiling  granted  to  Poland  is  also  disproportionate  to  the 
requirements of the inner market. As the overall (potato and other) starch balance shows, until the year 2003-
2004 the domestic demand for Poland was about 180 thousand tons of starch and starch products. For this 
reason,  the  net  import  was  low  (table  4).  Following  our  accession  to  the  European  Union,  the  volume  of 
domestic  starch consumption increased to over 300 thousand tons, which means that the net import of 100-200 
thousand tons is necessary. The deepening gap between production and consumption indicates that the quota 
granted to us is incompatible with the increased demand of the domestic market.  
 
Table 4. Balance of export, import and production of starch and starch products in Poland during the period: 
2001-2008, thousand tons. 
















Total exports of starch products  68,5  89,8  108,4  120,4  141,4  117,6  107,5  91,4 
- in these: potato flour and starch  40,9  57,5  72,9  54,4  64,0  28,5  34,7  436,6 
- other starch products  27,6  32,3  35,5  66,0  77,4  89,1  72,8  54,8 
Total imports of starch products   85,0  95,0  109,9  205,9  246,2  332,7  275,4  204,7 
- in these: potato flour and starch  0,4  0,4  0,2  4,6  9,8  19,5  7,6  10,7 
- other starch products  84,6  94,6  109,7  201,3  236,4  313,2  267,8  194,0 
Balance: exports/imports  -16,5  -5,2  -1,5  -85,5  -104,8  - 215,1  -167,9  - 113,3 
Production of potato starch  135  165  178  158  130  79  115  130 
Domestic consumption 
(production minus exports 
plus imports) 
151,5  170,2  179,5  243,5  234,8  294,1  282,9  243,3 
a/ forecast. 
Source: Own calculations based on: Dzwonkowski W., Szczepaniak I., Zalewski A., Chotkowski J., Rembeza J., 
Lewandowski  R.  Rynek  ziemniaka.  Stan  i  perspektywy.  Analizy  rynkowe,  nr  35.  IERiGŻ,  ARR,  MRiRW, 
Warszawa 2009. 
3.3. Significance of starch potatoes in the structure of harvests 
 
The next argument  for increasing the potato starch production ceiling fixed to Poland results from 
differences in the structure of potato utilization as well as their role in the regions with less fertile soils that are 
threatened with marginalization
9. In the majority of EU states consumption and processing into foodstuffs and in 
some of them also processing into starch dominate in the structure of potato utilization
10. In Poland the overall 
utilization of the potato for feed is decisively higher. This entails numerous and unfavorable consequences since 
the potato production for feed is located mainly in the regions with less fertile soils which have much bigger 
share in Polish agriculture (about one third) than in other EU member states. In the recent years the level of feed 
consumption is decreasing fast which leads to the decrease of  potato share in the structure of harvests. It leads to 
the extensive plant production which puts the balanced agriculture in the regions with less fertile soils at risk. 
Increase of  starch production quota would enable to enlarge potato production in the regions with less 
fertile soils and partially counterbalance the consequences resulting from the decrease of potato production for 
feed. Correspondingly, increase of the starch quota should be treated not only as a way of   more in-depth 
utilization of the processing capacities of plants and better adaptation to the market demand, but also as a factor 




The above analysis explicitly shows that the specific economic market factors of the country, such as 
the processing capacities of  plants,  volume of  internal demand as  well as the  significance of potato in the 
structure of harvests were not taken into consideration in the process of setting the potato starch production quota 
for Poland. Since the fair competitiveness constitutes the overriding principle of functioning of the European 
Union, the urgent amendment of the starch quota set for our country seems to be grounded. Moreover, with 
respect to this regulation the exceptional mode of procedure should be applied due to the fact that the previous 
attempts to change this state of affairs were not successful. The paradoxes of the situation caused by low starch 
quota in Poland brings into question the point if in the long run the whole concept of quota as such is to be 
rethought and needs more decisive reforms.    
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